Present theory suffers from a lack of knowledge of the subject (and a consequent oversimplification). In modern times, philosophical pragmatism follows Nietzsche’s hypothesis by denying absolute “dualisms” (represented by the sets of opposites) and asserting a continuity among all parts of nature. This severity in the face of external dangers requires a certain uniformity of behavior, and a lack of tolerance for variations. There is, he says, a certain hypocrisy in philosophers who fail to admit this, and who insist that their views are dictated by pure reasoning. Religion has assisted this, and democratic social systems have resulted. The daring philosopher of the “perhaps” (section 2) may even suppose that “unselfishness” is valuable only as an expression of selfishness, for example, when it is exercised as a right on the part of a powerful individual; he can afford unselfishness, because of his richness. It has simply been transformed, and is represented, for example, in “culture” by the aesthetic pleasure of the tragic drama. The rise of atheism is not necessarily a sign of religious decline, but of the failure of the theistic interpretation of things. “Love of one’s enemies,” for example, seems to have developed into a moral standard, but even this operates on an unconscious level, and not as conscious “attitude.” This, however, is a superior stage since conscience now comes into play (compare section 32). His affirmation reaches its peak when he is willing to accept the possibility of an eternal recurrence of all things, As man’s intellectual horizons expand, so does his world, and the views of the past appear small in contrast. Each individual has an innate value, and this can be often discerned by observing how reverent the individual can be. Artists, too, are inclined to oversimplify and distort reality as an escape from truth.

It is assumed, therefore, that “natural law” cannot be “violated” without some form of punishment. The function of moral restraint in producing spiritual qualities is discussed in sections 188-189.

In their place, he offers the "will to power" as an explanation of all behavior; this ties into his "perspective of life", which he regards as "beyond good and evil", denying a universal morality for all human beings. The Socratic view that the source of evil is error, since no man really desires to injure himself (and all evil is ultimate self-injury), is a form of Utilitarianism, the moral theory which places pursuit of happiness uppermost.

A certain egoism is a natural inheritance of the noble soul, and the noble exercises his superiority without evil intent, merely as a form of natural “justice”. The idea that thought requires a subject, “I,” which does the thinking, is one which derives from overattention to grammar. 850 B.C.)